National Policies and Multinational Corporations: Implications for Russia by Strizhevskaya, J.V.
National Policies and Multinational 
Corporations: Implications for 
Russia
Strizhevskaya, J.V.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-93-037
July 1993 
Strizhevskaya, J.V. (1993) National Policies and Multinational Corporations: Implications for Russia. IIASA Working Paper. 
WP-93-037 Copyright © 1993 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3776/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Working Paper 
NATIONAL POLICIES A N D  
MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA 
Julia T I .  Strizhevskaya 
(Russia) 
WP-93-37 
July 1993 
BIIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria Telephone: +43 2236 715210 Telex: 079 137 iiasa a o Telefax: +43 2236 71313 
NATIONAL POLICIES A N D  
MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA 
Julia V. Strizhevskaya 
(Russia) 
WP-93-37 
July 1993 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed 
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
HIIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis o A-2361 Laxenburg o Austria Telephone: +43 2236 715210 o Telex: 079 137 iiasa a Telefax: +43 2236 71313 
Foreword 
This paper was prepared while the author was a participant of the Young Summer Scientists 
Program (YSSP) and member of the Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project, a t  the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg during the summer 
of 1992. 
This essay is dedicated to  the issues related t o  the relationship between national and transna- 
tional business. The paper does not concentrate on the formal aspects of the issues but assumes 
as a basis the tendency towards globalization of industrial development and the related achieve- 
ments and influence of multinational corporations (MNC) and national enterprises. Russian 
government officials and local businessmen will increasingly face the need t o  understand MNC 
strategies and motives but also the means t o  achieve their own goals. All in all, the elaboration 
of a national industrial policy carefully considering global business developments is of prime im- 
portance for the future of the Russian nation. The activities of MNCs can significantly influence 
economy, society, technology, and politics in the compelling and sensitive transition t o  a market 
economy in Russia. 
Both the author and the ETI  Project are grateful to  the Dutch National Member Organiza- 
tion t o  IIASA, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research in the Hague, for funding her 
participation in the YSSP, making the research for this paper possible. The author also thanks 
IIASA's staff for facilitating excellent working conditions and all other YSSP participants for 
creating an unforgetable atmosphere. 
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NATIONAL POLICIES AND 
MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA 
Julia V. Strizhevskaya 
(Russia) 
1 Introduction 
As recently as two or three years ago, many policy-makers anticipated (and some of them still do 
today) that  the market itself would automatically remedy the situation of economic stagnation 
in Eastern Block countries, adjust the restructuring of the economy to  more appropriate pat tern, 
reorient industry t o  meet the needs of citizens, help in the rapid development of more advanced 
enterprises, and force the  laggards t o  reorganize. But as it turns out, it is not so simple. Markets 
are both destructive and creative. There are losers and winners. If the market will actually be 
more destructive, then the Eastern Europeans will be losers. In East Germany, since monetary 
union, industrial production has fallen by over 40%. At the time of monetary union, i t  was 
thought that about one third of East German industrial enterprises would have t o  close down. 
Now, there is skepticism as t o  whether any enterprises will survive (Kaldor, 1991, p. 366). 
The essential problem of the East European economies and Russia is industrial and techno- 
logical backwardness. But i t  is not backwardness in the same sense as in third world countries, 
because the former possess a great number of skilled workers, scientists, and engineers. Never- 
theless, industrial and technological resources are wasted due t o  an absence of normal economic 
rules which are necessary for establishing a rationally organized economy. I t  seems t o  be a 
foregone conclusion that  previously centrally planned nations must join the world of market 
economics if their post-communist industries are t o  survive. However, the practical elements 
of change are the key factors available t o  governments t o  influence the integration process of 
the national economy in international production and innovation processes. The factors in- 
clude measures that  can help countries to  preserve domestic high-technology enterprises in the 
absence of the central distribution system and that  might assist technological innovations t o  
diffuse, avoiding one-sided dependency on foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and other 
economic subjects. 
The multinational corporation is a key institute of our contemporary world economic com- 
munity on the  one hand, and, on the other, i t  is in the heart of contradictions between individual 
national interests and participation in the global division of labor. This paper at tempts t o  ana- 
lyze this issue from different standpoints. To start,  there is a description of the general political 
issues that  have arisen around MNCs. The second part of this paper is devoted t o  the theories 
explaining the development of multinational production and distributional networks; beginning 
from theories which interpret this development as an internal process of growth of an organiza- 
tion to  ones which consider MNCs as a spin off of the contemporary trend to  globalization. The 
third part is dedicated to  an analysis of MNCs' strategical behavior and the related national 
industrial policies. The final part of this study attempts to  select and explain the main features 
most suitable for Russia's industrial policy during the current transition to  a market economy. 
2 The Politics Around MNCs 
2.1 The postwar liberal conception of economic order 
In any book about multinational corporations (MNC), the first chapter is usually dedicated to  
the enormous growth of their participation in world production and trade. Here, too, are some 
striking examples that demonstrate these phenomena. 
Indeed, General Motors' 1985 sales were larger than the gross domestic product (GDP) of one 
hundred and four countries (not counting the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) and well ahead 
of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland (World Bank, 1987, p. 206-207 and 
United Nations, 1988, p. 335-340). Although the subsidies provided by the Japanese government 
to support the successful ascension to  leadership in microelectronics (estimated between $300 and 
$500 million during 1975 to  1979) were large in absolute terms, IBM's research and development 
budget is as much as $1200 million per year (Doz, 1987, p. 127-129). This said, let us turn t o  
the political background of MNCs' rapid expansion. 
It appears quite possible to link the spreading of MNCs across the globe with the predom- 
inance of the liberal approach to  international economic relations. Furthermore, France and 
Japan, the two countries whose national policies reveal the greatest opposition to  multinational 
corporations, are countries in which liberalism is not part of the national philosophical tradition. 
Compared with the control of money and trade, the international control of multinational 
enterprises has been extremely limited. The need for monetary and trade regulations became 
clear as a result of the world economic crisis in the 1930s, which was a crucial force behind the 
establishment of postwar management mechanisms. Regarding global investment management, 
however, no such international crisis and no consensus have arisen in the West. Moreover, the 
management of international investment had not been a part of the U.S. scheme for a new 
postwar economic order. 
Like any philosophical conceptions of regulations concerning the establishment of social- 
economic life, the liberal conception represents the interests of definite forces and is not to  
be considered as an irrefutable progressive idea. Its predominance in international economic 
relations depends on the type of truly predominant forces in the world economy at  present. 
Ironically, in response t o  strong pressure from U.S. business groups, the U.S. delegation at  
Geneva proposed a draft article on foreign investment in 1947. The article, intended to  codify the 
prevailing Western liberal attitude toward foreign investment and the rights of capital-exporting 
countries, provided for protection against nationalization and discrimination. However, during 
the negotiations the under-developed countries, led by Latin American states, were able t o  alter 
its character: the proposed article eventually protected capital importers, not capital exporters. 
Provisions of the Havana Charter allowed capital-importing countries t o  establish national re- 
quirements for the ownership of existing and future foreign investments and to determine the 
conditions for further investments. The inclusion of the investment provisions was a main reason 
for the opposition of U.S. business to the Havana Charter and for its eventual failure. 
In spite of the fact that the policy of developing countries gained the upper hand in the nego- 
tiation process, the economic power was with U.S. business a t  that time, effectively determining 
the world economic order. This once again corroborates that an agreement is only effective if it 
genuinely reflects the existing balance of powers. 
2.2 The powers of a host country 
The cluster of host countries is divided into developed host countries and developing host coun- 
tries. Although the most part of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from and correspondingly 
returns back to  OECD countries (refer to  Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix), the history of rela- 
tions between MNCs and developing countries has proven to be more unpredictable. 
After long years when governments of Third World countries remained silent about multina- 
tional corporations' behavior in their countries, they took the lead in publicly opposing MNCs in 
the 1960s and, especially, in the 1970s. These years were marked by waves of nationalization and 
new laws and regulations designed to  strengthen governmental control and to  increase the host 
country's share of the economic rewards from foreign investment. Multinational corporations 
have also used their power in the politics of the home state to obtain foreign policies favorable 
to  corporate interests. For example, they have helped to  conceive specific legislation, such as the 
Hickenlooper amendment, which enables the U.S. government to  cut-off aid to  any country na- 
tionalizing U.S. investment without compensation; the Gonzalez amendment, which requires the 
United States to  vote against any multilaterial bank loan to  a nationalizing country; the trade 
legislation which withdraws General System of Preference (GSP) tariff benefits from any coun- 
try that expropriates U.S. companies without compensation; and the special institutes as, for 
example, Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Finally, this struggle of legislation led U.S. 
business (as the greatest investor in the world) to elaborate international legislation expecting 
to deter, through an international agreement, congressional legislation and to  internationalize 
any constraints placed on a U.S. firm. 
In the 1970s, these various forces of change resulted in attempts to regulate multinational 
corporations by the rules of New International Economic Order (NIEO). In 1974, the United 
Nations (UN) made two major statements on organizing the NIEO: the declaration of the Es- 
tablishment of the New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States. Both of these documents asserted the full sovereignty of each nation over its 
natural resources and all economic activities including the right of nationalization. The Dec- 
laration of the Establishment of the NIEO made no reference to any compensation, and the 
Charter simply said that any compensation should be "appropriate." Also, the UN established 
a Center on Transnational Corporations, which gathers and generates information on multina- 
tional corporations, and also the Intergovernmental Commission on Transnational Corporations, 
which acts as a forum for considering issues related to  MNCs, for conducting inquires, and for 
supervising the Center. But the attempt to  draw up an international code of conduct has proven 
impossible. As usual, the international legislation reflects the existing balance of world powers. 
Really successful efforts t o  control multinational corporations came from the national level and, 
sometimes, from the regional level. 
The ability of government to control MNCs is shaped by the availability of the skilled persons 
necessary to  draft and enforce laws and to  negotiate agreements to  regulate foreign investment. 
One reason for the shift in power from the multinationals to  the host government was their 
significant expertise in monitoring and regulating foreign investments. They trained cadres in the 
legal, financial and business skills necessary to regulate foreign subsidiaries. This movement up 
the "learning curve" made it possible for a host government to develop the laws and bureaucratic 
structures for managing multinational corporations (Moran, 1974, p. 164). 
The second reason was that by the 1970s host countries developed a weakness for investors 
who already made a significant and successful investment in their country rather than with 
potential investors. The host countries then had jurisdiction over a valuable multinational asset 
and could subsequently reverse their former permissive policies attracting investment. 
The third reason contributing to  the shift in power was the increasing competition for invest- 
ment opportunities in the Third World. The changes in the economic and political alignment of 
forces between developed countries resulted in substituting investment flow from one tradition- 
ally dominant Northern home country (often it was a mother country in the past) to another 
in the process of choosing foreign investors. Thus, for example, Japanese multinationals have 
emerged as an alternative to  U.S. firms in Latin America, and U.S. companies have in turn 
emerged as an alternative to  French firms in Africa (UNCTC, 1983, p. 18-19). 
Some experts consider that this shift from foreign investor to host government can clearly 
be seen in the case of raw materials, such as copper and oil (Spero, 1990, p. 247). It is less 
clear in the case of manufacturing because it is more difficult for developing countries to  control 
global manufacturing firms with worldwide production and marketing and local subsidiaries 
remain dependent on the parent company for supplies, capital technology, and markets. As 
a consequence, U.S. business, as the world's largest investor, finally undertook to  elaborate 
international legislation expected to  deter congressional and local legislation and internationalize 
any constraints placed on U.S. firms. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Third World countries strategy for control and confrontation 
shifted toward more pragmatic policies regarding the activities of multinational corporations. 
There were numerous reasons for such an alternation. Depressed economic conditions and low 
rates of return in most developing countries during this decade were an important factor in 
the decline in investment flows. Table 6 in the Appendix shows that rates of return on U.S. 
FDI in Latin America fell from 18.8% in 1980 to  2.4 in 1983 before again rising to  10.8% in 
1985. Rates of return on U.S. investment in other developing countries fell from 41.3% in 1980 
to  18.6% in 1985. These unfavorable conditions for FDI in conjunction with the debt crisis 
in many developing countries were simultaneous with rapid growth, rising rates of return, and 
few restrictions on foreign investment in many developed countries. Also, policies of developed 
countries were followed by international institutions as, for example, the World Bank and such 
legislation as the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 were directed to  improve access for FDI. In the 
1980s, many developing countries shifted, in general, from state-led investment to  private-sector 
investment strategies. The clearest manifestation of this new approach were the privatization 
policies of several developing countries: they divested a number of state-owned companies to  
the private sector. 
These various forces converged in more liberal policies towards foreign direct investment. The 
new liberalism did not reverse established restrictive polices. Countries continued to  control the 
entry and operations of foreign investors; most laws, regulations, and institutions put in place 
to control foreign investment remained; while countries open up some sectors, such as those 
that exported or involved high technology, they maintained tightly closed policies in others (for 
example, the service sector). Multinational corporations gradually came to  be seen less as a 
threat and rather as a potential opportunity for promoting growth and development. 
The regulation of MNCs has never been such a highly politiziced and controversial issue in the 
Western system as it has in the Third World. One factor shaped generally positive perceptions 
of multinational corporations; namely, the dominant liberal philosophy. Other reasons are these: 
the role of large corporations is not seen as dangerous for an existing national economy where 
domestic corporations play significant roles; although MNCs control sensitive sectors, they do 
not usually loom too large in the national economy of developed nations; and, there is also a 
strong relationship between the multinationals and governments of the developed countries. 
The ability to  control multinational corporations' behavior is crucial to  management be- 
cause it involves activities that affect national economic performance and national control, such 
as taxation, labor policy, capital movements, and competition policy. Indeed, governments 
in the developed countries closely regulate the operations of those firms-both national and 
multinational-operating within their borders. However, with some exceptions, the developed 
countries have not imposed special or differential regulation on the operation of multinational 
corporations. Undoubtedly, MNCs can influence economic performance and national economic 
management in Western countries, but they cannot undermine the authority of these powerful, 
sophisticated governments. Western governments possess not only the expertiselawyers, ac- 
countants, economists, business experts-to regulate MNCs but also the confidence that they 
can devise means for control. 
2.3 Economic domination and independence 
Most of the negative views on multinationals are centered on fears that they might erode the 
national control of the economy. Interestingly, the intangible fear of loss of decision making is 
not related to  the level of foreign investment. Canadians, who have a vast amount of foreign 
investment, are no more concerned than are the English or French, who have much less. The 
fear of lost control seems to  be related more to  different national expectations regarding the 
need for independence than the actual threat to  that independence (see Peninou et al., pp. 59, 
1977 and Fayerweather, 1972, pp. 472, for more discussion). 
After the collapse of military "socialism" in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the 
problem of national independence expressed itself in the problem of correlation between economic 
powers and scientific-technical potentials of different nations. These correlations determine the 
ability of a national economy to  engage in the world economic system (WES). Undoubtedly, 
MNCs are important instruments for joining economies in one common interdependent economic 
mechanism. The success of a country's entrance in the WES depends on whether it takes the 
role of home or host country. 
Canada, for example, has traditionally had diverse and high levels of foreign investment. It 
was the most extreme case in which a chiefly host country was a developed country. The former 
prime minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, explained Canada's position as follows: 
"I don't worry over something which is somewhat inevitable, and I think the 
problem of economic domination is somewhat inevitable, not only of the United 
States over Canada but perhaps over countries of Europe as well ... These are facts 
of life, and they don't worry me. I would want to  make sure that this economic 
presence does not result as I say in a real weaking of our national identity. I use 
that general expression too. The way in which I do that is to  try and balance the 
benefits against the disadvantages. It is obvious if we keep our capital and keep our 
technology, we won't be able to  develop our resources and we would have to  cut up 
our standard of consumptions in order to  generate the savings to  invest ourselves 
and so on... Each country wants to  keep its identity or its sovereignty, to speak in 
legal terms. It has to  instantly make assessments, and when we make assessments 
it is to  try and select those areas which are important for our independence, for our 
identity."(Spero, 1990, p. 124). 
Japan gives a striking example of successful home country policy. For decades, economic policy 
encouraged growth of "national championsn-large corporations, capable of competing globally 
with U.S. and West European Corporations in high-technology sectors. At the same time, Japan 
restricted foreign direct investments. It was trying to  procure the benefits of multinational cor- 
porations by purchasing advanced technology through licensing agreements instead of acquiring 
technology through foreign control. As a result, foreign investment in Japan has been quite low 
(see Tables 3 & 4 in the Appendix). 
The transition to more liberal Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Laws in 1980 
from their limiting scope previously in 1950, took place only after strengthening the position of 
Japanese MNCs in Western industrialized economies. There was also an increasing need to  have 
legislation more compatible with that in such prominent host countries as the United States and 
European countries. 
Interdependency of contemporary scientific and technological knowledge gives host countries 
the technical impulse and opportunity to  eventually become home countries for new industrial 
giants. On the other hand, under the pressure of the increasing expense incurred to  retain a lead 
position in the world market, the traditional investor countries attract FDI for restructuring and 
technology re-equipment in their own economies. 
There is now a change from quantity to  quality values of MNCs' contributions in a national 
economy. For example, the fear of losing control over sensitive industries is particularly acute. 
Many nations, including the United States, have always been concerned about foreign ownership 
in such sectors as communications, transportation, and finance. Increasingly, public officials felt 
that industries with a large influence on the economy, such as automotive and petroleum indus- 
tries, or those in the vanguard of scientific and technological development, such as computers 
and electronics, should remain under national control. 
Governments behave themselves like multinationals choosing the best partners for "strate- 
gic alliance." In spite of the fact that laws must be equivalent for everyone, when in 1987 
the Japanese company Fujitsu Ltd. tried to  acquire an 80% share in the American Fairchild 
Semiconductor Corporation, (a  larger supplier of computer chips for the U.S. military), various 
U.S. government officials argued strongly that the sale ought to be blocked on national security 
grounds. Ironically, Fujitsu was proposing to  buy the 80% share that already belonged to  an- 
other foreign firm, the F'rench company Schlumberger Ltd. (Spero, 1990, p. 188). Apparently 
the concern of the U.S. government was not simply the foreign buyers, but the presence of the 
Japanese in particular, with whom U.S. semiconductor competition has been fierce. 
It is clear that economic policy of countries, especially developed ones, has often been in the 
interest of their powerful multinational corporations. One cannot but admit that: UThe global 
corporation is not the instrument to bring about economic redistribution ... The global enterprise 
may spread wealth geographically, but it concentrates i t  politically and sociallyn(Barnet and 
Muller, 1974, p. 379). 
3 Dynamic Processes Inside and Outside Multinational Cor- 
porat ions 
Many of theoretical conceptions exist concerning both the development of MNCs and worldwide 
evolution in the light of MNCs' activities. In this section, I briefly describe the theories which 
reflect the main ideas about multinational companies and reinforce the final aim of this article- 
the definition of the most optimal approaches of Russian policy toward MNCs. This is one of 
the key factors necessary for the integration of Russia into the global economic system. 
3.1 Why a firm spreads abroad 
Specialists investigating the theory of MNCs have determined that: foreign direct investment 
follows the foreign markets. If a firm's market increases the firm grows, if a firm stops growing 
it dies. 
The most widely recognized dynamic model of the evolution of international industry is the 
Uproduct life cycle" concept devoted by R. Vernon (1966, pp. 190). It postulates that demand 
for a given product moves from an innovating country to other countries over time as they 
develop, and that the location of manufacturing follows the move of demand with some lag. 
As the product matures, not high technology but lower manufacturing costs (resulting in lower 
prices and greater demand) become the critical competitive variable and process innovation 
subsequently prevails over product innovation. Higher demand growth and lower manufacturing 
costs in the imitating countries allows them to capture the competitive advantage from the 
innovating country. Therefore, countries move from an early position of exporter to  that of 
importer. This product life cycle model has been widely used to  explain the internationalization 
of different industries, particularly electronics. 
As demand for a product moves from country to country, the innovating firm first satisfies 
such demand from its domestic plants via export. Threats of entry by competitors, trade barriers 
and national demands for local production, the concern to  avoid the cost of distant shipments, 
or the opportunity to produce at  a lower cost, induce firms to  commence production in the 
importing countries. But why does the innovative firm initiate production locally by itself 
rather than license a local firm? 
The internalization theory of multinational activity explains why sole ownership has been 
the preferred scheme from the enterprise's point of view (Williamson, 1985). Foreign subsidiaries 
owning unique intangible assets provided by their mother company could hope to bear local com- 
petition. By new product and manufacturing process technology, marketing skills for product 
differentiation, scanning the world for raw materials supplies and potential export markets-at 
a much lower cost of information than national companies-MNCs could further their advan- 
tages. Professional management and standardized administrative procedures also allowed them, 
at least in theory, to  maximize operational efficiency and minimize administrative costs. Since 
most of the intangible assets is a "public good" (i.e., it is impossible to exclude anyone, even 
competing firms, from profiting from it once it becomes generally known), companies cannot 
afford to  use open market practices such as exporting or licensing if they wish to profit from 
developing this knowledge. As a result, the company "internalized" the market by setting up a 
wholly owned foreign subsidiary that can ensure maximum control over the use of that asset. 
It was a paradox that the networks of MNCs were actually spun by the imperfections of the 
markets. For example, Casson and Buckley's theory is based on three simple postulates (1976, 
p. 33): 
(a) firms maximize profit in a world of imperfect markets; 
(b) there is an incentive to bypass these markets by creating internal markets, this involves 
bringing under common ownership and control the activities which are linked by the mar- 
ket; 
(c) internalization of markets across national boundaries generates MNCs. 
Over time the markets became less imperfect, and the alternatives to the MNC developed. 
Joint ventures and licensing are other structuring options available to multinationals. In certain 
countries, they are the only avenues available due to the restrictive investment policies of host 
countries. Another option that has become more common recently in certain industries is the 
strategic alliance. Strategic alliances are partnerships between separate, sometimes competing, 
companies from different countries. The companies are drawn together because each needs 
the complementary technology, skills, or facilities of the other. Nonetheless, the scope of the 
relationship is strictly defined, leaving the companies free to compete outside the relationship. 
The catalyst for these arrangements has been the rapidity of technological change and the 
skyrocketing costs of development, especially in high-technology sectors. 
3.2 How a MNC grows 
Now consider the multinational company not in light of the "market paradigm," but rather 
regarding the "paradigm of organizational structure." 
Ln general, the theory of organization explains the growth of multinationals as the consistent 
evolution of a mother company's organizational structure connected with increasing the volume 
of its activity. The whole process of an enterprise's evolution from small firm to multinational 
corporation can be subdivided into three stages. According to  this concept, the firm first passes 
through these stages in the domestic market and then in the world market. Each phase corre- 
sponds with the creation of the organizational structure. The evolution of structures expresses 
the dynamics of the firm's growth and development and of its business strategy. Transition from 
one phase to  the next is an adaptive reaction of the company to  the change of the operative 
demands. 
Stopford and Wells (1972) describe the organizational structure of a company as a scheme 
of organizational and administrative management. Their opinion is that the success of the 
company and its evolution from a lower to  a higher phase is defined by skills and abilities of the 
managers because they elaborate the firm's strategy and ensure realization of adopted decisions. 
Therefore, the key for transforming a national company into a multinational is the availability 
of experienced superior managers. 
The first phase is defined as: The firm controlled by one person. There are some functional 
divisions, and chiefs of all departments are subordinate to  this one superior manager. 
The second phase: The hierarchic structure of the firm becomes more complicated, for 
example, functional divisions divide to  new subdivisions and sections but the main principle 
of organizational structure does not change. As a rule growth of the firm is due to  vertical 
integration. This structure is very stable in industries where the rate of technological changes 
is not very high. 
The third phase: The organization of one department becomes a copy of the organization of 
all the firm in the second phase. Every department is regarded as a profit center and can produce 
its own type of production. The structure implies existence of different sections and controlling 
groups in the direction, while the superior manager works on strategic questions and not on 
everyday problems. This structure gives the opportunity to  increase or decrease the number of 
diverse production centers without influencing the other centers' operational processes. 
Very often, first subsidiaries have only financial connections with the mother company during 
the initial period of foreign production activity (first phase of a firm's growth in the common 
world market). But subsidiaries' autonomy have only temporary character. With the maturing 
of the firm as a multinational company, subsidiaries become more and more aware of the influence 
of the mother company's global strategies (second phase). An analysis of the development of 
170 firms during 1900-1970 showed that more than 60% of the subsidiaries refused autonomy 
before their mother firm created its fifth foreign subsidiary (Stopford and Wells, 1972). By 1966, 
none of the examined 170 firms had autonomous subsidiaries. The fully maturing MNC pursues 
worldwide policy by its foreign subsidiaries, while each subsidiary can additionally have its own 
regional or even world strategy. 
3.3 From integration to globalization 
A "new human history" in globalization of world demand has evolved. "Today, the whole world 
has one common demand schedule, one common set of economic values and preferences. The 
whole world, in other words, has become one economy in its expectations, in its responses and 
in its behavior" (Drucker, 1969). The only, truly international economic institute of this world 
economy is the multinational corporation. 
Many experts see the mature corporation as the main and primary factor in creating the 
new technocratic society. "The notable feature of the modern corporation and thus of the 
planning systems is the uniformity of its cultural impact, regardless of its national origin. Its 
hotels, automobiles, service stations, airlines are much alike not because they are american but 
all are the products of great organizations" (Galbraith, 1973, p. 172). Furthermore, according 
to  Galbraith, the market yields its power to  the new system, managed by the technostructure. 
The firm is not subordinate to  the market. Thus, the neoclassical model has become a chimera. 
Large corporations (together with governments and unions) are the social institute shaping the 
new economy. 
The World Oral Examination "Europrospectiven (April 1987, Paris) concluded that the key 
factor in forming new social and industrial structure is the emergence of new technologies. More 
than a thousand participants of the "Europrospectiven directed attention to  the practical as- 
pects of world globalization in the 1980s: the new "globaln firms have emerged, the scale of 
the common technical, financial and business cooperation has increased. The boundaries among 
technologies and branches of activity have been effaced. The new flexible production systems, 
new materials, and biotechnology raised a question about traditional industrial structure. The 
common strategies, like, for example, economies of scale, lost their attractiveness based on in- 
creasing the volume of production: inflexible industrial structure and immutability of consumers' 
demands became inviable. 
The new strategies use technological knowledge in many diversified activities in different 
business fields. The connections between pure science and applied research were strengthening in 
some fields of knowledge. The transition from fundamental investigations to concrete production 
tasks became quite direct in high-technology industries. Interconnectiblity and compatibility 
have become more and more critical. Present and future profit depends on the quality of 
demand; for example, on the skills of users no less than on the skills of the producers. The 
globalization of information markets changes the forms of concentration and pluralism in the 
interfirm relationship. The most obvious shift to globalization can be seen in the financial sphere 
of economic activity. 
Specialists considered that the majority of the production companies could gain from the in- 
ternational competitiveness of their production only by cooperating in alliances. Contemporary 
competitiveness presupposes the development of a world scale production system, ownership of 
key technology, the operative renewal of the whole assortment of production, access to the global 
distribution networks in order to  use economies of scale, and to advance on the competitors in 
their home markets. 
The evidence appears to indicate that multinational corporations may be far ahead of the 
rest of the world in these extraordinary claims on the future. 
4 National and Multinational Business Strategy 
4.1 The definition of key multinational business strategies 
Vernon (1966) wrote that the term "multinational corporationn is not absolutely correct, because 
only common management strategy unites companies of different countries into a single whole. 
According to  Doz (1987), multinational integration and national responsiveness are principle 
choices which express a clear strategy. Some companies, however, try to  avoid developing one 
of these marginally clear strategies but attempt to  combine elements of both; the strategies of 
such companies can be labeled as multifocal (Doz, 1987, p. 12). 
Whether one strategy or another is more or less attractive to  the firm is a function of 
underlying economic and technological characteristics of the industry in which it acts, of the 
extent and form of government intervention in that industry, and of the competitive posture 
of the firm. A choice in principal has to  be embodied in a complex industrial and managerial 
structure so that the daily choices within the organization correspond with the chosen strategic 
orientation. 
Multinational integration is defined as the specialization of plants across borders into an 
integrated multinational production/distribution network. Instead of manufacturing products 
to  satisfy the needs of each national market, the MNC produces in each country only part of a 
common product range, or implements only some stages of a product's manufacturing process. 
Therefore, integration strategies result in centralized management, since key decisions affecting 
operations in one country also affect those in another country directly. Subsidiaries' managers 
obviously provide input into the major decisions affecting their subsidiaries, but the decisions 
are not their own. 
Contrary to the strategy of integration, subsidiaries of nationally responsive MNCs behave as 
if they were national companies. Subsidiaries are free to respond to host country's demands and 
MNC headquarters seldom intervene in their local manager's decisions. Typically, subsidiaries 
manufacture a relatively complete product range in each country so that intersubsidiary trade is 
not significant. A nationally responsive MNC does not compete independently in each national 
market, but rather coordinates actions of its subsidiaries to maximize the common competitive 
impact. 
The management of a multifocal firm strategy pursues both strategies. The multifocal strat- 
egy provides the flexibility needed for accordance of the firm with the more powerful factors in 
the environment in a more opportunistic way. Thus, this strategy creates an ambiguous form 
of management. For understanding how numerous and diverse decisions will be made it is nec- 
essary to know what questions are within the scope of local managers' responsibilies and which 
are the responsibility of top managers. Ultimately though, the conditions of this distribution of 
duties are set by top management. 
4.2 Main determinants of a MNC's strategic choice 
Industrial, economic, and technological characteristics make multinational integration, national 
responsiveness, or multifocal strategies more or less attractive to multinational companies. The 
nature of demand and the cost structure in an industry are the major determinants of the rela- 
tive importance of various sources of competitive advantage and, therefore, in the choice of one 
or another strategy in managing an international business. Integrated and nonintegrated multi- 
nationals capture different market segments even in one and the same industry; integrated ones 
provide low cost of production through their efficient production systems, while nonintegrated 
ones show superior adaptive flexibility. 
A mix of privileged access to these markets, government-funded research programs, assistance 
in export, and other forms of subsidies are often used to  involve MNCs in cooperation with 
governments. Host governments are not indifferent to the choice of strategy by multinational 
companies. Government officials prefer control, but can they strive for control at  the expense 
of the part of the state treasury and jobs. MNCs executives face the same dilemma but from 
the opposite side: they prefer integration, but should integration be pursued when it results 
in higher tensions with their host governments? If a firm expects that integration strategy 
can facilitate higher efficiency and returns than could be achieved with national responsiveness 
policy, it will choose the integration option. In such cases, governments usually seek to share 
some of the benefits of integration with MNCs. The relationship that develops between an 
integrated MNC and a host country may be seen as one where the MNC incurs some cost of 
Figure 1: Customers, market shares and multinational strategies: a hypothetical relationship. 
/ / 
Mut t  ~ n o t ~ o n o l  / 
/ / 
~ n t e g r a t l o n  / / 
- strategies / / 
' -- 
/ 
0 L I I 
0 2 0 . l i '  60 80 100 
Percentage of soles t o  government controlled customers 
Source: Doz, (1987), p. 54. 
citizenship in exchange for the host government's continued license t o  the MNC to maintain its 
integration. 
The most obvious cost of citizenship would be differential taxes. Yet most countries do 
not discriminate between national and foreign investments except by taxing repatriations of 
dividends and, in some cases, payments of royalties by foreign subsidiaries and import tariffs. 
Normally, costs of citizenship are also incurred through intangible asset transfers. 
The most likely type of strategy an MNC can follow in a business is a function of (a) the 
extent of government control over markets for that business and (b) the relative market share 
of the MNC in that business within a given free trade area (Doz, 1987). These relationships are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
The prerequisites are the following (Doz, 1987): 
1. Where trade-offs are clear, industry structures are simple. Where economic characteristics 
drive towards integration and government control over the markets is not extensive, global 
industries develop. Where national control is a priority, separate industries survive, usually 
a t  high opportunity costs. 
2. The more the overall market share of a MNC in a free-trade area is exposed to  international 
competition, the more likely the MNC is to  follow an integration strategy. 
3. Facing the competitive pressure from both large integrated MNCs within a region and low 
cost importers from outside the region, smaller MNCs and national firms will attempt t o  
differentiate their products and services to  escape direct competition. When no economic 
basis clearly exists for strategic segmentation of the business, such companies will try to  
enlist host government support to  create artificial differentiation, usually in the form of 
non-tariff barriers to  trade (domestic preference) or policies discriminating between firms 
(e.g., research subsidies, public purchasing preferences, export assistance, etc.). Alliances 
among smaller firms of different countries, with complementary skills and market access, 
are likely t o  multiply. 
4. In industries characterized by a moderate level of government control over markets various 
types of firms are likely to  co-exist. 
Doz selected different industries in Western Europe by the extent of government control over 
markets (Table 1). It is possible t o  display the result in Figure 1 in order to  classify industries 
and define clearly the most probable firms' strategies in each of them (Figure 2). 
Table 1: Sample of Industries and the Extent of Government Control (percentage). 
Industry average approximate extent of 
government control over markets 
Color TV tubes 0 
Agricultural tractors 
Automobiles 
Trucks 
Microelectronics 
Computers 
Aero engines 
Civilian airframes 
Drugs 
close t o  0 
2 
12 
20+ 
30 
Telecommunication equipment 68 
Electricity-generation equipment 90 
Military aircraft 100 
Note: The extent of government control over markets is measured by the share of the market accounted 
for by government-controlled customers in Western Europe. 
Source: Y.Doz, (1987), p. 147. 
4.3 Global competition in industries 
The automobile industry is an example of a global industry. However, global competition in this 
industry does not signify the presence of solely liberal enterprise management with governments 
not implementing policy to  improve competitive positions of their national industry. 
Some countries have set out to become major competitors in such a global industry by first 
closing their national markets to  foreign companies (but gaining access to  their technology), 
then by establishing an efficient domestic industry based on a rapidly growing domestic market, 
and finally by assisting this national industry in competing internationally. Japan provides 
the most striking case of such a growth strategy. In the 1950s, all Japanese suppliers were 
Figure 2: Customers, market shares and strategies of some industries. 
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involved in agreements with second-tier foreign producers for technology and machinery. As 
technology in the automobile industry was already relatively mature second-tiers' technology was 
comparable to  that of major multinationals. In the 1960s, the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade (MITI) encouraged mergers among domestic firms to  achieve more efficient production. 
Since that time, great attention was devoted to export market needs, product quality, and the 
development of dealer networks abroad. In the 1950s and 1960s Japan's large domestic market 
remained protected by barriers t o  importers and by the exclusion of FDI. Only in the 1970s was 
foreign investors' minority equity position in Japanese companies authorized. 
The transition to  global competition opened new opportunities for some national industries, 
but isolation rather than integration could lead even a well-developed industry to decay. Coun- 
tries with a large market and low cost labor were becoming very attractive to  MNCs attempting 
to  develop export bases. Brazil became made even more attractive as a result of government 
policies such as tax abatements and low interest rate loans to exporters, consequently deriving 
many benefits from the globalization of the world automobile industry. Argentina could not play 
the role of a base for Latin America's automobile industry because the Argentinian government 
was concerned with the survival of its domestic industry. 
In addition, countries with a strong autonomous, nationally owned industry enhance their 
competitiveness through various measures. The experiences of France, Germany, and the United 
States suggest that a combination of direct assistance and encouragement to car manufacturers 
and the establishment of a large, stable, profitable home market base (usually by subsidizing 
cars as means of transportation and by financing highway construction) were the appropriate 
ingredients. The lack of similar policies in the United Kingdom and the inability to  maintain 
good labor relations were largely responsible for the deterioration of British industry: the British 
market did not grow, nor did export; in the mid 1960s, Britain had 22% of the world's car exports, 
a decade later it was only 6% (Doz, 1987, p. 82). 
Scale economies in production and the need to  provide a full range of production to retain 
effective distribution now call for integration in the automobile industry. There are relatively few 
choices open to companies and governments. Company strategies tend to  cluster into integration 
strategies or into specialization strategies aimed at  exploiting particular segments and niches in 
the market. There is nothing for the government to do but support these strategies because 
protection is not a viable option to ensure the future of a national automobile industry. 
4.4 Government-controlled industries 
Government-controlled industries mean those whose products are sold mainly t o  government 
agencies or to  state-owned customers but not necessarily made by stateowned enterprises. In 
addition to  the military, these include state monopolies, such as mail and telecommunications 
or electrical utilities, railroads, or national airlines. Instead of convergence of national markets 
into a worldwide competitive market, these industries usually remain to  compete in separate, 
protected and negotiated national markets. In these industry segments cost competition is 
offseted by competition of equipment reliability and efficiency. State-owned customers express 
their demands through the conditions of their purchase of equipment, and government exercise 
more direct control which involves access to  preferential credit, joint ownership, threats to  call 
new suppliers, the allocation of research and development contracts, and assistance for export 
Figure 3: MNC Bargaining Power 
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sales. 
The MNC bargaining power in a government-controlled business varies in accordance with 
the maturity of the market and the technology involved. The less mature is a market and newer 
the technology, the greater is the bargaining power of a MNC. Owning new products when either 
their technology is difficult to master or it is protected by patents or when using the product 
requires difficult and costly competencies, raises the bargaining power of a MNC. Conversely, 
the more mature is a product, and the better known and widespread its technology, the easier 
independent national production develops in mature markets either through takeovers of MNC 
subsidiaries or through national companies (market share shifts in favor of domestic suppliers). 
Figure 3 reflects this relationship. 
Technology is the main source of power for the firm. In government controlled sectors more 
than in others, governments actively erode the multinational firm's advantage and force them 
to be increasingly responsive to  national requests such as product adaptation, local compliance, 
employment, trade balances, location of research, and local ownership (refer to Table 2). The 
maturing of a national market for a new high-technology product of a multinational company 
shifts the balance between a national customer and multinational suppliers and, therefore, con- 
ditions of a host country and MNC agreement change in the course of time. 
In summary, national responsiveness is the most obvious strategy for government-controlled 
business. Only some technology leaders have achieved some level of integration. The overall 
success of a MNC depends on its ability to  adapt itself to various market conditions. Companies 
can also develop a posture of national responsiveness in mature markets and a partial integration 
Table 2: Evolution of Host-Government Demands in a Government-controlled Market. 
Emerging product Transition to maturity Mat ure-product 
market market 
Performance/ Local manufacturing Autonomy of local 
cost rations subsidiary 
Up to  date tech- Adaptation of product Better efficiency 
nology to  local conditions than national competitors 
Reliability, durabi- Local R&D activities Responsiveness to 
lity of equipment national policies 
Financing Exports from subsidiary 
Installation, training 
and start-up assistance 
Willingness to set up Possibility, joint owner- 
local manufacturing ship with local interests 
operations 
Successful tender and Acquisition or joint None profitable, except 
new investment ventures on emerging segments 
with unique technology 
Source: Y. Doz, (1987), p. 99. 
in new markets. Sweeping changes in technologies sometimes alter the cost structure of the 
business to  such an extent that the relative advantages of integration and responsiveness shift. 
It becomes imperative to  generate the cash flow required to  recoup past R&D efforts and find 
new ones. This shift makes competitors more willing to engage in trade of technology, either via 
"partnership" (alliances) or via technology transfer agreement (with weaker partners). 
The level of national technology is also a key determinant of the bargaining power of host 
governments and sets limits to  their international ambitions. A country can develop an indige- 
nous technological capability evolving from technology transfer recipient to  adapter, and even 
innovator. Often, the conjunction of a very large domestic market with focused R&D efforts 
and significant government assistance for exports has led to success. 
4.5 Mixed-structure industries: difficult consent between the economic and 
political priorities 
To a great extent, national sectoral strategies in global industries can be seen as mirror images 
of multinational business strategies. Government support to  firms competing in these segments 
is driven by the same logic as multinational integration strategy: to  achieve low-cost production 
and international competitiveness through high-production volume. The protected national 
position of a broadly based national industry, like a national responsiveness strategy, is provided 
by responding extremely well to  national conditions. Finally, multinational alliances are analog 
to multifocal strategies. Such alliances attempt to  meet economic imperatives without foregoing 
government control. 
Table 3: Private and Public Sector Computer System Market Shares in Selected European 
Countries 1971-75 (in %). 
Germany France U.K. Belgium 
Total Public Total Public Total Public Total Public 
market sector market sector market sector market sector 
European 
suppliers 20 44 32 48 36 59 25 64 
U.S. suppliers 80 56 68 52 64 4 1 75 36 
(*) Including U.S. subgidiaries in Europe. 
Source: Compiled by Y. Doz (1987) from "Report Concerning the Development in the Data Processing Sector 
in the Community in Relation to the World Situation," COM (76) 524, Vol. 111, Bruesels, Commission of the 
European Communities. 
The host government's dilemma results from the contradiction between the conflicting eco- 
nomic and political priorities. Sources of government concern, such as the relationship t o  na- 
tional defense, displacement of existing industries, threatens t o  end the production industries 
call for the development of broad based independent national capability. Yet, the strength of the 
competitive conditions, expressed in such features as fast and expensive technological evolution, 
difficulties in technology transfers (much of the technology cannot be transferred without trans- 
ferring the engineers and scientists themselves and often not without maintaining their links 
with the original firms (Layton, 1972; Braun and MacDonald, 1978)), growing importance of 
control of diverse Ucore" technologies for protecting the independence of end-product industries 
toget her with transformation of production of some previous government-controlled sectors from 
socially and politically important ones to  commercial businesses provide sufficient grounds t o  
relinquish government protection and shift from national autonomy to integration strategies. 
This conflict between national protection and selective international competition is not easily 
resolved. Just a t  this very time, most European countries might agree to  protect the European 
computer industry from the American and Japanese ones based on the extent of the EC market. 
Table 3 shows the extent of the preference given to  national suppliers in the public sector of 
European countries. 
Doz (1987) considers that the most successful approach to  gain world competitiveness of 
such national industries' production is selective support of national companies in international 
competition. uLimited national resources would need to  be focused on specific product segments. 
Such segmentation would imply, though, that only selected national needs be met through local 
production. Dependence on foreign suppliers would continue for others. Competitiveness could 
be achieved on a narrow front, but inherent risk of integration would remain" (Doz, 1987, p. 
125). The logic of this national strategy is clear: to  beat the integrated MNCs at  their own 
game. Japanese advances in the electronic industry provide an illustration of a feasible success 
using this approach. 
Alliances among national firms can provide the critical benefits of multinationality with- 
out loss of the national responsiveness. By pooling resources and skills and providing a large 
multinational market, such multinational alliances overcome obstacles of economies of scale in 
R&D, manufacturing and marketing. The leading companies are the most attractive partners in 
alliances so that their leadership could be prevented from becoming dominant. Ln the absence 
of suitable multinational partners or for maintaining some balance in markets, and preventing 
leadership from evolving into dominance, governments often support alliances between national 
firms. Table 4 summarizes the correspondence between major kinds of policy tools and national 
strategies. 
Mixed-structure industries raise the most difficult dilemmas between economic and political 
imperatives, but also offer the best opportunities for cooperation between MNCs and govern- 
ments with growing government involvement in the economy and more sophisticated industrial 
policies. By the way, exactly those countries whose national markets were closely controlled by 
the government until recently, such as Japan, Brazil, or Mexico, show successful entry into the 
international economy. Thus, diversity of economic, technological and political factors increases 
the number and significance of mixed-structure industries. 
5 Conclusions for Russia 
5.1 Development of competition as a key problem of economic reform 
The logic of centralized planning can be seen in wartime. It was the Polish economist Oskar 
Lange who defined the Soviet planning system as "a war economy sui generis." It was best 
suited to  impose the priorities of the political leadership. In accordance with these political 
priorities the economy was divided into two sectors with different technical levels. The priority 
sector connected with the Ministry of Defense and with prestige projects maintained world 
competitiveness of its production and existed at the expense of the civilian sectors of the national 
economy. Ultimately, the economic inefficiency of most civilian industries led to  the failure to 
satisfy growing demands of the military sector and increasing technological dependence of high- 
technology industries on the common technological environment caused difficulties in supporting 
even limited number of industries at an acceptable level. 
Why were ministries and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC), in contrast 
to  civil branches, interested in the introduction of innovations and technical growth, and were 
they responsible for maintaining the military balance? As shown in the third part of this paper, 
economic competition is not always value competition. In government-controlled industries 
of developed countries, competition among companies is based more upon quality, equipment 
reliability, and compliance with the needs of state-owned purchasers than solely on price. Inside 
the MIC there was real competition between enterprises for getting orders and, consequently, 
guarantees for better wages and provisions than in the economy in general. 
The economic crisis occurred when the state, as the single customer for these industries 
became bankrupt. The only possible decision was to  improve state revenue and the only known 
way for stimulating economic efficiency was the establishment of a market system. The economic 
reform was inevitable. Nikolay Shmelev expressed the situation in these words: "It is essential 
t o  realize that the cause of our difficulties is not only or not solely due to  the heavy burden 
of military expenditures and the very expensive global responsibilities of our country. If we 
expended them correctly, even the remaining resources would be sufficient for maintaining a 
balanced and technically progressive economy and for satisfying the traditionally modest needs 
of our population. However, prolonged attempts t o  break up the objective laws of economic 
Table 4: National policies 
Government tools Selective competition Broad base protection Multinational alliance 
1. Market access control Important to establish domes- Provides only possible mar- Contrary to  the purposes of 
2. Subsidies and grants 
$3 
3. Fiscal incentives 
4. Export assistance 
5. Pricing policies, financing policies 
tic base and provide early vol- 
ume to  decrease costs. Early 
sales may be subsidized. Un- 
needed later on. 
Required to  provide resources 
needed to acquire command- 
ing positions in se- 
lected segments: R&D assis- 
tance, investment grants, em- 
ployment/training subsidies. 
Should disappear after a few 
years if policy successful. 
Possible: tax rebates, acceler- 
ated depreciation, capitalized 
R&D, etc. 
Very important, particularly 
to controlled markets (e-g., 
Soviet Union). 
Higher domestic prices and 
high debt leverage to  provide 
cash flows to  expand abroad. 
Domestic prices to  be lowered 
later on. 
ket and underlies choice of 
this policy, (e.g., problems 
with the French military buy- 
ing TI'S circuits rather than 
SESCOSEM7s). 
Unescapable unless full mar- 
ket control is achieved, and 
only higher priced or less per- 
formant equipment is made 
availabe (e.g., SESCOSEM 
pre-1978). 
Same as for selective com- 
petition, but less critical if 
more direct means of protec- 
tion available. 
Possible, but success may only 
take place where major com- 
panies are forbidden to  par- 
ticipate (e.g., microelectron- 
ics manufacturing equipment 
sales to  Polaroid). 
Prices set to  ensure viability 
of firm, higher than interna- 
tional prices. 
- - 
the alliance but useful to  bring 
in MNC partner collective 
protection (e.g., the EEG lim- 
iting U.S. imports). 
Should be minimal, except a t  
start-up phase. Similar to se- 
lective competition approach. 
May be necessary to  bring in 
valuable partners (e.g., C21- 
Honeywell). 
Same as for selective 
competition. 
Very important. May be 
needed to  bring valuable 
partners. 
Should apply pressure to align 
prices with those of integrated 
MNCs. 
Source: Y. Doz, (1987). 
life, to  suppress the age-long natural stimuli for human labor, brought out results quite different 
from what was intendedn (Shmelev, 1987). 
The following market propaganda was similar to  that of the former communists. Nobody 
could predict that the Russian economy would fall into lingering crisis or even to  economic dis- 
aster. Deliberately or de facto, the market (i.e., the system of free price formation) occupied all 
economic spaces which had dropped out of the authority of production-administrative systems. 
But the famous economic mechanism did not function. Instead, it only destroyed the economy 
more and more. Soon it was noticed that a market system without internal competition does 
not automatically lead to  economic prosperity. "Such an economy is characterized by a high 
rate of inflation, corruption, low efficiency of production, sharp differentiation in the living stan- 
dards of the population, and social tension. So we should not be surprised that the growth of 
market forces under the monopoly of the highest degree-a characteristic feature of the Soviet 
economy4oes not lead to  increased efficiency of production and greater supply of goods but 
to  price increases, falls in output, and shortagesn (Glaziev, 1991, p. 105). 
The attempts to develop markets, let alone growing markets which are necessary in times of 
reconstruction have failed and the country faced an economic crisis. These attempts are useless 
because one of the fundamental characteristics of efficient market activity is the presence of 
a solvent purchaser. Without customers for the products of Russia's high-technology sectors, 
the industrial system will require inevitable restructuring; perhaps not in the desirable manner 
required for technological progress and economic prosperity, but in a fashion that rather suits 
contemporary living standards of the population and conditions of the national budget. So, the 
time of self-sufficient development in Russia is a t  an end and future advances will depend on how 
negotiations are conducted with foreign customers or partners in production and distribution 
alliances. 
Economic efficiency and competitiveness of national production is one of the main aims of 
national industrial policy-makers, the same as with MNC executives. Firm behavior differs in 
correspondence with the diversity of economic and technology characteristics of the industry 
in which they work, the competitive posture of the firm, and so on. By analogy, the national 
industrial policy must be essentially diverse for different sectors of the economy: free market 
and global competition in one industry may combine with close government control and central 
planning in another. A mix of planning and market must base itself on commercial reasoning 
and scientific forecasts about technology and industrial development. The difficulties for the 
Russian government lie not only in inevithle admission of the fact that successful transition 
will be limited t o  a smaller group of industries or enterprises inside an industry than presently 
exist. 
5.2 National industrial policy and multinational corporations 
The basic differences between industries and the competitive posture and strategies of different 
firms in the same industry greatly influence host governments trying to  devise and implement 
industrial policies. It is important for a government to  understand both the characteristics of the 
specific industry structures, and the differences in the efficacy of various means of intervention. 
On the surface, the United States government appears to  have the most flexible policy 
framework for a broad range of industries, including almost all of high-technology. Japanese 
industrial policy sets out  to dominate selected, narrowly defined segments serving selected end- 
products. This strategy aims a t  leadership in modern high-growth sectors where advances are 
more profitable now and important for future development. European countries follow the 
policy of integrated or coordinated national efforts within the European Community in order t o  
maintain competitiveness versus powerful U.S. and Japanese corporations. 
What kind of industrial policy should the Russian government follow? Presently, Russia 
can hope to  become globally competitive in only a few selected industries and, what is more, 
i t  is often possible only in cooperative alliances with foreign business. An aversion to  complete 
destruction of the part of the economy that  cannot hope to  endure international competition in 
the nearest future is the  most urgent political and economic issue. Conditions must be created t o  
gradually improve the competitive posture and bargaining power of national firms that  resemble 
the contemporary international type. 
The knowledge concerning preferable industrial structure in different segments of the econ- 
omy is necessary for elaborating national industrial policy. I t  should influence all government 
programs as, for example, privatization. In the process of economic reform the privatization of 
most state property is considered one of the key pre-conditions for the successful marketization 
and reconstruction of the Russian economy. Privatization can assist in reducing monopolization 
and creating a preliminary base for competition. The present privatization program intends to  
sell each enterprise independently. Consequently, this may lead to the destruction of the past 
production-department unions, some of whose output is high-technology production. Nonethe- 
less, these types of Russian goods can now be sold only in the international market. Thus, 
the fear is justified that  the production of huge western MNC will emerge victorious in their 
competition with mostly dismembered Russian firms. It is clear that competitors must be in 
the same class. If a country is not able to  establish a domestically competitive market, i t  will 
be confronted with growing Unational champions." Not without reason, the Japanese govern- 
ment provided a policy of integrating national companies into powerful units in anticipation of 
international competition. 
The  conditions for survival and success of firms in internationally competitive industries may 
be determined analytically. The failure of such famous companies as Chrysler, whose integration 
was too slow for the  imperatives of an automobile industry, or as Westinghouse, which in contrast 
tried t o  integrate production in a traditionally government-controlled sector, once more confirms 
the importance of adopting the predictable strategies. 
On the other hand, work on industrial policy should not be guided by considerations about 
present industry structure because new technologies may put in question traditional boundaries 
between industries and raise new opportunities for competition. Industrial policy should ideally 
consider the future and prepare for the development of new technology applications and diversity 
of corresponding needs (i.e., from the availability of specialists to  defining distribution networks). 
There is little evidence t o  suggest great government foresight in identifying potentially significant 
industrial innovations. Russian governments, like many others, have very often just realized 
the importance of a new industry when foreign companies had already managed t o  achieve 
considerable success in its development. 
The aforementioned causes should motivate Russia t o  seek collaboration with international 
business institutes, including the most powerful among them-multinational corporations. 
Though Russia wishes to  maintain a liberal policy, it does not intend to allow foreign companies 
to reap the greatest benefit from her more free market policy or, what is worse, to make them 
sole owners. The behavior of foreign business will be defined by what will be easy and profitable: 
either to gain access to low-cost productive input factors now or to work for the huge future 
Russian market. The aim of a government's international policy is to prevent the former and to 
stimulate the latter. 
Doz wrote: "Selecting which firms to.negotiate with, and what for, thus becomes a critical 
element of industrial policy in international industries (e.g., where reigns global competition)" 
(Doz, 1987). Direct foreign investments are better than portfolio ones because they bring not 
only financial resources but also a package of product, technology, management, and market ac- 
cess. Nevertheless, they bear a danger that foreign subsidiaries might dominate national enter- 
prises. The most popular way to access these advantages are joint ventures, licensing agreements, 
management contracts, and turnkey arrangements-all substitutes of total or majority owner- 
ship. On the one hand, officials should regulate the multinationals so as to maximize national 
benefits and to minimize national costs. On the other hand, they should not make regulation so 
restrictive that it will deter potential investors. The government can define the pre-conditions 
for cooperation with bilateral or multilaterial agreements (such as bilateral investment treaties, 
taxation regulation, patent legislation) in ways which increase the attractiveness of investment 
opportunities and, thus, intensify competition among foreign businessmen for making a contract. 
The accordance of FDI to government plans for industrial reorganization is the main purpose of 
control and regulation policy. 
So, government policies play a very significant role in creating pre-conditions for a new 
Russian economy, but the deciding vote belongs to Russian business. In today's Russian cir- 
cumstances, it is very important for enterprises to attract foreign investors or partners, to screen 
them, to find or collect detailed economic and technological data for the proposed project and 
investors, and to elaborate advantageous contracts in the end. 
Information is needed with respect to formulating policies which affect the role that a MNC 
might play in the given economy. It is also a crucial determinant of the capacity of governments 
or national companies to negotiate satisfactory deals with MNCs. Information relevant to any 
negotiated process includes, among others, the strategies used by MNCs, the policies and strate- 
gies of other countries with respect to  MNCs engaged in similar activities, and the international 
market forces. MNCs usually have easy access to such information, while for Russian govern- 
ment institutes and local enterprises it is often a difficult problem. Jorg Simon, a member of the 
U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations writes: "In general, to manage the activities and 
participation of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the economy, the Government of a host 
developing country has to establish an institutional infrastructure. The objective of National 
Informational Systems on Transnational Corporations (NISTNC) is to assist the appropriate 
agency(ies) in responding to the information needed at the several levels of the involvement of 
TNCs in the host country" (Simon, 199.1). 
It is necessary to organize a special scientific-consulting center on MNCs in Russia (not 
to mention the specifics of government control structures). Cooperation with such organiza- 
tions existing in other developing as well as developed countries and with the U.N. Center of 
Transnational Corporations may enrich both Russian economic knowledge and data and that of 
other countries. Besides serving present national policy or firms' business objectives, this center 
could contribute to  economic science by studying MNC behavior in the transition to  a market 
economy-as yet, a neglected area of research and potential. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Distribution of foreign direct investment inflows, by major region, 1975-1985, (in %) 
Annual averages 
Country groups by region 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1975-80 1981-85 
Developed market economies 70.6 80.5 73.6 69.8 76.8 78.5 76.7 76.6 75.2 
United States 
Western Europe 
Japan 
0 t her 
Developing countries 29.3 19.3 26.4 30.2 23.2 21.3 23.3 23.4 24.8 
m 
w Africa 2.3 0.4 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.4 2.5 3.3 
Latin America 
and the Caribbean 15.3 11.9 13.6 14.4 7.7 7.0 9.1 12.5 10.5 
Western Asia 3.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.2 1 .O 1.9 0.8 
Other Asia and Oceania 7.4 6.1 9.3 10.8 10.7 9.6 9.1 6.2 9.9 
Southern Europe 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Worlda 
Billions of dollars 
aExcluding the centrally planned economies of Europe. 
Source: United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations (1983), based on International Monetary Fund, balance-of-payments tape; and other 
official national and international sources. 
Table 2: Distribution of foreign direct investment outflows, by major home country, 1975-1985, (in %). 
Annual averages 
U 
Country groups by region 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1975-80 1981-85 
Developed m a r k e t  economies 98.9 98.1 99.4 96.6 97.3 98.6 98.0 98.8 98.0 
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  
France 
Germany, Federal 
Republic of 
Italy 
Net herlands 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Japan 
United States 
Developing countr ies  1.1 1.9 0.6 3.4 2.7 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.8 
Worlda  
Billions of dollars 
'Excluding the centrally planned economies of Europe. 
Source: United Nations Center on Transnational corporations, based on International Monetary Fund, balance-of-payments tape; and other official 
national and international sources. 
Table 3: Inward stocks of foreign direct investment, by major host region, 1975-1985, (in Billions of US dollars). 
percentage of percentage of percentage of 
Countries/region/areas Value total GDP Value total GDP Value total GDP 
Developed market economies 185.3 75.1 4.5 401.0 75.6 5.1 478.2 75.0 5.5 
Western Europe 100.6 40.8 5.8 159.6 30.1 5.6 184.3 28.9 6.6 
United States 27.7 11.2 1.8 137.1 25.9 4.2 184.6 29.0 4.7 
Other4 57.0 23.1 7.0 104.3 19.7 6.0 109.2 17.1 5.7 
Japan 1.5 0.6 0.3 5.0 0.9 0.4 6.1 1 .O 0.5 
Developing countries and territories 61.5 24.9 6.4 138.4 24.4 7.4 159.0 25.0 8.5 
Africab 16.5 6.7 15.7 19.6 3.7 9.7 22.3 3.5 10.8 
o Asiac 13.0 5.3 3.2 40.1 5.8 4.9 49.6 7.8 5.7 
c. 
Latin America and 
the Caribbeand 
Othere 
Total 146.8 100.0 4.9 539.4 100.0 5.5 637.2 100.0 6.1 
'Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa. 
'~otswana,  Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenia, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiria, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
'Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Province, Thailand. 
d~rgent ina ,  Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
eFiji, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yugoslavia. 
~ x c l u d i n ~  the centrally planned economies of Europe, for which no precise data are available. 
Source: United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, based on J. Dunning and J. Cantwell, IRM Directory of Statistics of International 
Investment and Production (New York, New York University Press, 1987); and official national and international data. 
Table 4: Outward stocks of foreign direct investment, 1975-1985, (in Billions of U.S. dollars). 
percentage of percentage of percentage of percentage of 
Countries/region Value total GDP Value total GDP Value total GDP Value total GDP 
Developed market economies 67.0 99.0 6.7 275.4 97.7 6.7 535.7 97.2 6.7 693.3 97.2 8.0 
United States 31.9 47.1 6.2 124.2 44.0 8.1 220.3 40.0 8.2 250.7 35.1 6.4 
United Kingdom 12.4 18.3 17.4 37.0 13.1 15.8 81.4 14.8 15.2 104.7 14.7 23.3 
Japan 0.5 0.7 1.1 15.9 5.7 3.2 36.5 6.6 3.4 83.6 11.7 6.3 
Germany, Federal 
Republic of 0.8 1.2 1.1 18.4 6.5 4.4 43.1 7.8 5.3 60.0 8.4 9.6 
Switzerland 2.3 3.4 26.9 22.4 8.0 41.3 38.5 7.0 37.9 45.3 6.4 48.9 
Net herlands 7.0 10.3 60.6 19.9 7.1 22.9 41.9 7.6 24.7 43.8 6.1 35.1 
0 
14 Canada 2.5 3.7 6.3 10.4 3.7 6.3 21.6 3.9 8.2 36.5 5.1 10.5 
France 4.1 6.1 7.0 10.6 3.8 3.1 20.8 3.8 3.2 21.6 3.0 4.2 
Italy 1.1 1.6 2.9 3.3 1.2 1.7 7.0 1.3 1.8 12.4 1.7 3.4 
Sweden 0.4 0.6 2.9 4.7 1.7 6.4 7.2 1.3 5.2 9.0 1.3 9.0 
0 t hera 4.0 5.9 3.1 8.5 3.0 1.7 17.4 3.2 1.9 25.6 3.6 3.3 
Developing countries 0.7 1 .O - 6.6 2.3 - 15.3 2.8 - 19.2 2.7 - 
Centrally planned economies 
of Europe - - - - - - - - - l.ob 0.1 - 
Tot a1 67.7 100.0 - 282.0 100.0 - 551.0 100.0 - 713.5 100.0 - 
'Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain. 
b1983. Rough estimate. 
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, based on J. Dunning and J. Cantwell, IRM Directory of Statistics of International 
Investment and Production (New York, New York University Press, 1987); and official national and international data. 
Table 5: Selected home countries: ratio of outward foreign direct investment stocks to total corporate assets (in %). 
United States 
A 11 Non-financial Federal Republic United 
Year corporations corporations Japan of Germany Kingdoma 
1945 1.8 - - - - 
a1957. 
b1966. 
=1971. 
d1969. 
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, based on official national sources. 
Table 6: Rates of return on United States foreign direct investment abroad (in %). 
Region sector 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Developed countries 16.5 11.7 8.0 9.0 9.0 16.2 
Petroleum 26.5 20.3 12.9 14.8 16.8 16.2 
Manufacturing 12.4 8.1 5.9 7.5 6.3 17.8 
0 t her 15.7 10.9 7.4 7.1 7.2 14.1 
o Latin America 
rP 
18.8 15.8 7.6 2.4 5.4 10.0 
Petroleum 23.0 23.0 17.1 9.7 0.2 8.3 
Manufacturing 15.8 11.5 1.6 -1.4 6.6 10.1 
0 t her 20.0 17.4 10.4 3.3 10.3 11.0 
Other developing countries 41.8 40.9 29.9 22.5 23.8 18.6 
Petroleum 79.7 65.3 42.6 26.1 28.5 21.2 
Manufacturing 18.3 18.2 12.8 18.4 20.1 17.6 
0 t her 24.2 25.9 22.9 19.7 18.7 25.2 
Source: United States, Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, various issues. 
